Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind



[Read] ➲ Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind ➺ Wilfrid Sellars – E17streets4all.co.uk The most important work by one of America's greatest twentieth century philosophers Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind is both the epitome of Wilfrid Sellars' entire philosophical system and a key The most important work by the Philosophy PDF/EPUB ã one of America's greatest twentieth century philosophers Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind is both the epitome of Wilfrid Sellars' entire philosophical system and a key Empiricism and ePUB Æ document in the history of philosophy First published in essay form in it helped bring about a sea change in analytic philosophy It broke the link which had bound Russell and and the Philosophy ePUB ↠ Ayer to Locke and Hume the doctrine of knowledge by acuaintance Sellars' attack on the Myth of the Given in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind was a decisive move in turning analytic philosophy away from the foundationalist motives of the logical empiricists and raised doubts about the very idea of epistemologyWith an introduction by Richard Rorty to situate the work within the history of recent philosophy and with a study guide by Robert Brandom this publication of Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind makes a difficult but indisputably significant figure in the development of analytic philosophy clear and comprehensible to anyone who would understand that philosophy or its history.Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind

Wilfrid Stalker Sellars May the Philosophy PDF/EPUB ã July was an American philosopher His father was the noted Canadian American philosopher Roy Wood Sellars a leading American philosophical naturalist in the Empiricism and ePUB Æ first half of the twentieth century Wilfrid was educated at Michigan the University of Buffalo and Oxford where he was a Rhodes Scholar obtaining his highest earned degree an MA in .

Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind PDF/EPUB ↠ the
  • Paperback
  • 192 pages
  • Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind
  • Wilfrid Sellars
  • English
  • 28 February 2015
  • 9780674251557

10 thoughts on “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind

  1. says:

    tfw u get jebaited into reading Analytic Philosophy's version of the Phenomenology

  2. says:

    Myth of the Given found dead in Miami

  3. says:

    An important argument that if it were widely understood could go a long way to ending the continuing tyrrany of the mistaken theory of empiricism Sellars makes an important step toward dissolving the perennial problems of free will and the mind body divide Unfortunately as other reviewers have noted he’s not a very good writer and it takes patience to sort through his obscue prose To make this argument clearly it would likely have to be about twice as long—but it would probalby be worth doing it considering that over half a century after it was written most people are still making the mistakes he points out

  4. says:

    Fantastic ideas on empiricism and how we experience the world but could have been clearly written Most philosophers seem to share this assessment

  5. says:

    Very opaue but with Brandom's help also very satisfying for the reader who values both science and folk accounts of existence and sees the two as part of the same fallible and noble attempt

  6. says:

    Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind is almost as challenging to read as it is brilliant but the last pages make up for all the effort by providing one of the most complete and innovative theories of human cognition in the history of Analytic philosophy It is without a doubt one of the best works of philosophy that I have encounteredBut first a note on Sellars's style While I do believe like other reviewers that Sellars's prose in undoubtedly difficult I think it is by no means bad It is a strange style borne out of the conciseness of his contemporaries the oddity of some of the most recent Teutonic thinkers he caters to Carnap Wittgenstein and the heaviness of the elder Germans whose shoulders he rests on Kant and Hegel But despite having to read most sentences than once I can't say it's a bad style It's weighty yet not verbose; concise and not dull; strange yet never sloppy I'm uite sure that with enough patience careful reading of his sentences will always clarify not contradict his argument which is something you can't say for all philosophers ie All the philosophers mentioned previously readable ones like Russell see On Denoting So while getting through the text is an inevitably difficult endeavor I cannot discourage anyone from doing so and reading the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy instead Admittedly the essay's structure isn't perfect and the path leading to the enlightening end is all but windy Sellars accumulates related observations arguments and distinctions to then drop them to start a seemingly unrelated new strand At times it can be hard to understand what the essay is about at all; sometimes it seems about sense data sometimes about empiricism at large sometimes about a general concept of the Myth of the Given; it is seemingly purely about epistemology in the beginning but also about language history of philosophy and science and where is the Philosophy of Mind aspect tauted in the title?; many times it can be hard to discern what Sellars's viewpoint even is and whether he is expounding a theory to defend it or to tear it down While individual passages do ualify for stimulating philosophical nuggets in themselves as a reading experience it can be uite disorientingBut Sellars manages to tie everything together into his epic ending recounting the Myth of Jones Part of me doesn't want to spoil it too much since it came as such a pleasant surprise to me Suffice to say it presents an alternative account of perception and mentalistic phenomena where to say I have an impression of red is not a indubitable b epistemologically foundational and c partly private dismissive of common sense mentalistic phenomena as traditional logical empiricists Ryle and to an extent philosophers in the modern period leading up to and perhaps including Kant Instead Sellars offers an alternative view through the narration of the story of Jones which draws on all the considerations made previously and the domains they are a part of It is a spectacular exception in analytic philosophy one shunning careful considerations of minor scope and favoring a true account of man person in the worldThe effect is a haunting one To be fair I don't know if the Myth of Jones is an accurate replacement for the Myth of the Given But I am excited by Sellars's willingness not only to dismiss a past theory for its insufficiencies but also to provide a substantive alternative in an attempt which I feel few other giants of analytic philosophy I'm looking at you Kripke and uine have tried in their greatest statements And I'm also shocked by his employment of many of the same categories and ideas of his fellow analytic philosophers ordinary language logic a general preference for nominalism a disregard for actual history to undermine the very claims that made theories of analytic philosophy popular in the first place It almost makes me wonder if had Sellars been present at the inception of logical empiricism as opposed to Ayer the history of analytic philosophy would have unfolded differently perhaps avoiding some of its original sinsI will say however that Sellars is unkind to those untrained in previous analytic philosophy or for that matter all philosophy Read your Carnap your Ayer your Wittgenstein Read your Descartes your Locke your Hume Your Kant Read Sellars

  7. says:

    That was extremely hard to read and I am really happy that I finally got something anything from it The included study guide helped a lot but I still had to read it many many times The material is extremely dense it goes against our most basic intuitions and Sellars is terrible at helping you understand what he is writing He lays the foundations for what he will cover eventually but you are left puzzled at why is he writing this now The claim is not that complicated I really wish I could have read this and the next paragraph before reading it even if what I 'll write is simplified or even wrong Sellars thinks that knowledge consists of two things First of having reliable differential dispositions which is something that we share with babies animals and things thermometers for example and second of being able to understand that you have this reliable disposition It's to enter “the logical space of reasons” the game of giving reasons for what you claim This is completely different from our traditional account according to which we get knowledge from our senses For Sellars we can only get beliefs knowledge from other beliefs The idea that sense contents provide the foundations for our beliefs is to fall prey to the myth of the given To be able to get concepts knowledge from sense contents you need to have concepts already and you get concepts by entering the game of giving reasons later in life from your peers This is the basic claimBut now Sellars has to answer how do our peers originally got the concepts since it wasn't from senses He answers this by making up the myth of Jones The myth shows how thoughts can be postulated to explain overt behavior by crating a theory that models them in language Jones basically theorizes that since his peers behave intelligently even when they don't talk they have inner speech This means that language comes before thoughts no thoughts without language even though after having thoughts you think before talking But Sellars doesn't say that we didn't have thoughts before discovering them The point is not that we don't have thoughts or sensations it's that they are not given it's that we don't have immediate access to them After having thoughts Jones can make another theory to get sense impressions this time to explain the cause of their new found perceptions Jones thinks what is the cause of me believing that something is red? Because the red object gives me a red impression That is his next theory and it is modeled on pictures of replicas of what is out there That's how we discover senses and they are direct The replica is the red thing not me seeing a red thing And the myth of the given is thinking that these replicas are the objects themselves and thus fit for knowledge claimsI am extremely attracted to this idea but for now I suspect it is because I am attracted to pragmatism relativism nihilism and all that But I think this second guessing of what I like can be thought as evidence against the given even if it is limited to psychological notions What is certain is that Sellars is an extremely important thinker if not the most important of the last half of the century Even though he is not really a fan of those dark isms I mentioned since he finds other ways to build foundations he does open the door for them see Rorty for example In any case I have only scratched the surface so I won't try to evaluate or discuss its implications yetAlso note that everything I have written is heavily based on Brandom's study guide who belongs in the pragmatism tradition There are other readings of Sellars Mcdowell's for example

  8. says:

    Really brilliant work Hard to know exactly what he's saying at many points but Brandom's study guide at the end is helpful Integrates Wittgenstein's insights on private languages with broader philosophy of science considerations about theoryobservation and spells out the epistemological implications The final 20 pages or so where he systematically develops his account of how inner talk would arise is marvelous I'm inclined to agree with most of Sellars conclusions but I do want to read about criticisms and do have a number of lingering uestions myself Eg does Sellars conclusion end up depending on the results of development psychology or can it stand on purely conceptual ground? How rigid are his epistemicnon epistemic and inferentialnon inferential divisions and are they subject to uinean criticisms? What does a naturalistic account of inner states look like? see Millikan What is the response of the foundationalist? Need to do a lot thinking to properly fit his thinking within contemporary cog sciphil of mind debates feel like it reflects on ualia representation and other debates but need to work out details Look forward to engaging with of his work soon

  9. says:

    I carried away from this text as an undergraduate the conclusion that whereas analytic philosophy historically wants to divide statements between the descriptive and the normative with only the former capable of having a truth value sellars implodes the distinction by noting that for any alleged descriptive statement claiming a truth value it rests upon a normative foundation to the extent that the person making the statement has surveyed the evidence in support of the statement and concluded that the evidence is good enough to warrant the conclusion that the statement is true which is to say that the truth laden description is something of an illusion lots in this text but that impressed me as a kid who loved moore ayer russell wittgenstein uine and others in the anglo tradition

  10. says:

    really hard to sift through

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