Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War (Modern War Studies)



Drawing On Evidence Never Before Seen In The West, Including Combat Records Of Early Engagements, David Glantz Claims That In 1941 The Red Army Was Poorly Trained, Inadequately Equipped, Ineptly Organized, And Consequently Incapable Of Engaging In Large Scale Military Campaigns And Both Hitler And Stalin Knew It He Provides A Complete And Convincing Study Of Why The Soviets Almost Lost The War That Summer, Dispelling Many Of The Myths About The Red Army That Have Persisted Since The War And Soundly Refuting Viktor Suvorov S Controversial Thesis That Stalin Was Planning A Preemptive Strike Against Germany.Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War (Modern War Studies)

David M Glantz is an American military historian and the editor of The Journal of Slavic Military Studies.Glantz received degrees in history from the Virginia Military Institute and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and is a graduate of the U.S Army Command and General Staff College, Defense Language Institute, Institute for Russian and Eastern European Studies, and U.S Army War

[[ PDF / Epub ]] ✅ Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War (Modern War Studies) Author David M. Glantz – E17streets4all.co.uk
  • Hardcover
  • 392 pages
  • Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War (Modern War Studies)
  • David M. Glantz
  • English
  • 21 September 2017
  • 9780700608799

10 thoughts on “Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War (Modern War Studies)

  1. says:

    The numbers are still shocking Between the outbreak of WWII in September 1939 and the day of the German attack in June 1941, the USSR increased the theoretical size of its Red Army from 1.5 million to 5.4 million men, having little doubt that war was coming But in the three months after Operation Barbarossa, the Red Army lost 2.8 million men, and in six months it would lose 4.3 million Dead, wounded and missing, to be sure but for Red Army soldiers, becoming a prisoner of war was a virtual death sentence.Glantz explored the archives to better understand the causes of a defeat of this magnitude His book is filled with numbers, statistics, lists, tables, and it is than a little dry But it reveals that a major cause of the defeat was this rapid expansion itself, and the failure of the Soviet economy to support it There were not enough weapons for all these soldiers, and not even enough uniforms there was not enough ammunition and not enough food The support and transport services were not up to the task of supplying this huge force, and failed to bring supplies and materiel to the front Of the 16,000 modern tanks that this reformed army would require, some 90% still had to be built Units that had equipment were often forced to leave part of it behind because they had no trans...

  2. says:

    Glantz earns a four star rating from me due to the originality of his research and work Looking at the Soviet army prior to 1941 is usually limited to Finland, or the one or two books usually heavily error prone on Nomonhon However, a staff level planning view of what the Soviet Army leadership were thinking and how their plans matched or did not to the reality of war is fascinating It is a must read for any student of the Eastern Front in WW2 on this basis alone.However, there are some glaring omissions which almost made me give it a 3 star The massive support that the Soviet Union provided Germany with from August of 1939 through June 1941 is omitted along wiht the severe war scare with Japan Glantz has unfortunately carried over a singular narrative that has the focus entirely on Germany even when Germany was the biggest ally and Stalin was worried about the UK or Japan This is not reflected in his research and it would make a fine update or even a second book to delve into the continency plans for the UK and Japanese conflict with Germany as ally from the period 1939 to 1941 The battle assessments from Finland, the border with Manchuria indeed, even the invasion of...

  3. says:

    Crammed with statistical detail and a little bit repetitive, but a sobering overview of Soviet military readiness on the eve of World War 2 One of the hypothesis Glantz is answering in this book is one posed by some revisionist historians who argue that the German attack was pre emptive and the Soviets were the ones who were about to wage aggressive warfare As Glantz shows, the Soviets were woefully unprepared for the German attack with most of their forces not up to full strength And as a result of the Stalinist purges, their leadership was also not ready for the task of leading any kind of attack let alone a defense against the German onslaught Despite the tremendous defeats in the early part of the war, the Soviets were basically able to trade bodies and space for time to build their military The survivors of the brutal year of 1941 became the core of a reborn Soviet army that marched to vic...

  4. says:

    Read like a manual at times Reminds me of the Wehrmacht in 1945 Every single reasonable idea a Soviet general had was summarily rejected by Stalin Hitler later played the same game to disastrous effect for Germany I guess these demagogues just can t resist.

  5. says:

    Another excellent reference, but just a reference Even Glantz s opinions appear to be expressed as facts and statistics.

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